In Chapters 1–7 we watched symbolic systems scale from cells to empires; here we follow that scaling to its modern zenith—the nation-state—and preview how later chapters (9–11) show post-modern media escaping state gravity once more.
8.1 Birth of the Modern State
8.1.1 French Revolution
The French Revolution was less a revolt against the Crown and more a revolution against the Church (Doyle 1980, p. 47). By attacking clerical legitimacy, Paris severed the ancient feedback loop that had kept altar and throne mutually reinforcing since Rome (see Ch. 5). Louis XIV’s Versailles had already centralized nobles at court, turning local power struggles into palace intrigue—and setting the stage for medieval localism’s undoing.
8.1.2 L’Ancien Régime
Under l’ancien régime, the Church legitimized emperors. Once that symbolic pipeline broke, sovereignty migrated from God to “the People,” letting constitutions—not catechisms—bind territories. The modern nation-state separates church and state, weakening clerical sway over politics and enabling the state to grow as an independent information processor.
8.2 State as Information Processor
8.2.1 Mass Culture
Railways and telegraphs renormalized information topography, homogenizing the volksgeist across space. Chapter 7 showed how steam and print shrank Europe; the same networks now let Paris broadcast Jacobin myths into every département, hard-wiring a national identity.
8.2.2 Fractional-Reserve Banking
Early gold-warehouse receipts evolved into banknotes once warehouses could communicate (Kindleberger 1984, ch. 2). Central banks and debt markets then funded armies on an unprecedented scale. Financial leverage thus became the monetary equivalent of telegraphy—amplifying local capital into continent-spanning force projection.
8.3 The First European Civil War: The War of Stupidity
A regional dispute over Belgian integrity between France and Germany escalated into World War I. Neither side anticipated a drawn-out conflict—hence “the war of the stupids.” Complex-systems lens: two tightly coupled power laws (German and French volksgeists) produced a single catastrophic cascade once a buffer node (Belgium) failed.
Anglestan Britain’s Expeditionary Force numbered only ≈ 100 000 veteran troops—far too small to threaten Germany (Keegan 1999, p. 358). Yet “Fortress Britain” still managed decisive naval blockades rather than futile continental offensives. Naval cables and radio allowed London to wield information asymmetry at sea the way Berlin wielded rail logistics on land.
8.4 Czarist Russia
Czarist Russia lost to a smaller German army in WW I, then sacked Berlin in WW II (Mawdsley 2005, pp. 112–13). The Mongol legacy of top-down centralization left Russia ill-suited to innovate; only once global armaments became standardized could its mass mobilization prevail.
8.5 The Formerly United States of America (uSA)
8.5.1 Teddy “the Cowboy” Roosevelt
Teddy Roosevelt is widely ranked the second-worst U.S. president (Greenstein 2009, p. 214). He exploded executive power—annexing Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—and selectively enforced the Sherman Act against Rockefeller, only to see it later used by Rockefeller against Morgan. His trust-busting mirrored Europe’s nation-building: central authority broke local monopolies, then faced meta-monopolies of its own creating.
8.5.2 Woodrow Wilson, PhD—The First Intellectual Yet Idiot (IYI) President
Wilson ranks as the third-worst U.S. president—sending voters as mere bargaining chips (Boller 1988, p. 172). He pivoted America from neutrality to full engagement in Europe’s civil war via submarine-war ultimatums, then treated American lives as leverage at Versailles.
8.6 The Second European Civil War—The War of Good and Evil
Evil, in information-theoretic terms, is mutual exclusivity: the devil as scapegoat. Good is value-creation via shared wants. WWII pitted imperial exclusionism against universal rights, concluding that some regimes must fall. Total war completed the “death of God” sequence: after states dethroned churches, ideology dethroned states that made themselves gods.
8.7 Nazi Germany
Unlike past European upheavals, the Nazis were elected—then used the Reichstag Fire to outlaw rivals and seize total power. Once in control, they
Re-centralized the state: Built the Autobahn and mass-produced the People’s Receiver radio, integrating Germany physically and informationally under the Führer.⁴
Harnessed mass media: The Ministry of Propaganda made “Heil Hitler” a daily ritual, enforcing ideological uniformity.
Militarized society: Universal conscription and armaments production transformed Germany into a war machine that, at peak, outpaced all neighbors combined.
Their rise illustrates how a modern state’s information infrastructure can be weaponized to concentrate power and mobilize entire populations. Chapter 9 will show how television diffuses that same infrastructure, making future totalitarianism harder—but viral populism easier.
8.8 European Federal Renormalization
The European Union was created to solve Henry Kissinger’s quip: “If I want to speak to Europe, who do I call?” What began as a common metal market became a supranational body. It reflects the renormalization logic first seen in Greek πόλεις clustering into Rome’s empire (Ch. 5) and later in U.S. federalism (Ch. 4).
8.8.1 Over-banked Europe — A Common Monetary Union
A shared euro imposes one interest rate on disparate economies: German surpluses subsidise Greek deficits. Banking consolidation thus mirrors media consolidation—large nodes swallow small when marginal signalling costs fall.
8.8.2 Butter vs. Olive-Oil Europe
Culinary shorthand divides Northern “butter” Europe from Mediterranean “olive-oil” Europe—two semi-independent volksgeists under one currency. Brexit showed the North Sea cluster resisting Alpine-Mediterranean centralisation.
8.8.3 Trans-Alpine Europe
Alpine tunnels and motorways reduce topographic drag; information flow now crosses the mountains that once separated Gaul, Lombardy, and Bavaria. Transport tech completes what Roman roads began, what railways sped up, and what EU directives now legislate.
8.9 False Renormalization: A Line in the Sand
Europe’s two civil wars killed its external empire; America’s intervention killed its own. Meanwhile Sykes–Picot borders froze Ottoman shards into nation-states misaligned with local volksgeists—illustrating that renormalization imposed from without can ossify, not integrate.
Notes & Sources
- Doyle, W. Origins of the French Revolution (1980) — p. 47.
- Kindleberger, C. P. Formation of Financial Cato (1984) — ch. 2.
- Mawdsley, E. World War II: Russo-German Conflict (2005) — pp. 112–13.
- Taylor, F. “The People’s Car and the Autobahn,” J. Mod. German Hist. (1998) — pp. 75–82.
- Greenstein, F. The Presidential Difference (2009) — p. 214.
- Boller, P. Presidential Misconduct (1988) — p. 172.
- Keegan, J. The First World War (1999) — p. 358.
The Z score 